Reframing Social Citizenship:



























It is the responsibility of government to ‘reduce and control the forces of market coercion, which place men in situations in which they have less freedom … to make moral choices and to behave altruistically if they so will’
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Welfare states across Europe are undergoing far-reaching reforms in response to the pressures of globalisation at fiscal and commercial and cultural levels, the shift to a post-industrial labour market and changes in family patterns.  Governments seek to ensure that welfare services contribute more to national competitiveness, operate in a more cost-efficient way and are more responsive to consumer demands.  One important response is the expansion of policies that stress individual responsibility, greater use of the market and the private sector and new forms of management in social provision.  These are based on an individual rational logic of agency.











Trust, Disquiet and Welfare State Reform


Crisis and Resilience in Welfare States

As has been extensively discussed elsewhere, welfare states in Western Europe developed under favourable economic, political and social circumstances (sustained growth, full employment, popular support linking middle and working class groups, low dependency, and stable families) during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.  More recently economic, political and social circumstances have altered and welfare states have faced challenges at all three levels.  Despite the pressures, they have continued to develop, although at a rather slower rate than before the 1990s and with occasional hiccoughs, as Chart 1 shows.  Resilience has been achieved by developing and adapting welfare systems.  In this governments have had four main objectives:

-	Meeting social needs that have expanded in range and intensity as new social risk emerge and population ageing and pension maturity impose further demands on social spending (Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2004, ch 1).

-	Ensuring that their policies continue to command the support of the major social actors and of electorates (Pierson 2001; Castles, 2004; Schmidt 2002).

-	Maximising the contribution of social welfare policy to international competitiveness in a more open and globalised world where national economies are more subject to stringent competition, where currency speculation can and has undermined fiscal polices and governments are less able to exert control over their national economies than previously (Sharpf and Schmidt 2000; McNamara, 1998; Jessop 2004).

-	Making welfare more responsive to the demands of an increasingly well-informed, and challenging citizenry (Giddens 1998; Norris 1999).

These pressures can give rise to conflicts, between more but cheaper welfare, the imperative of  competitiveness and citizen demands and the direction of resources and greater responsiveness.  These problems emerge in different ways across various European welfare states with their differing political systems (Huber and Stephens, 2001).

In this paper we discuss one approach, sometimes described as the Third Way or Social Investment State and particularly developed in the UK.  This country is the most prominent example of a liberal-leaning welfare state in Europe and consequently is often seen as an outlier in continental comparisons.  It relies more on means-testing, has a more limited social insurance system and has lower benefits in general and a more extensive private market sector than most European countries. Policies in recent years have if anything extended these differences.  However, UK governments of the right and centre left have developed an approach which adapts the Anglo-Saxon limited welfare state model to the European setting, and offers solutions to the above dilemmas.   These approaches are sufficiently attractive to have been taken seriously in the strongest corporatist welfare state, Germany as the Neue Mitte although their influence on policy does not appear extensive (Busch 1999; Hudson et al, 2008).

The paper falls into four sections which discuss the third way and the assumptions that underlie it, consider how these may lead to a reframing of welfare citizenship in relation to horizontal redistribution, based on reciprocity, vertical redistribution, based on social inclusion, and citizen trust in welfare state institutions, examine corresponding developments in European welfare states, and present evidence on responses to the reforms in the UK as a significant case-study.  We focus particularly on the risk that the new policies will meet the objectives set for them in the short term and thus gain the support of policy-makers, but erode the social inclusiveness and the political legitimacy of the welfare state.

I.  The Third Way and Individualism

The development of Third Way ideas has been extensively discussed elsewhere, for example by Blair 1998, Giddens 1998 and Driver and Martell 2006).  As a political ideology it arose from the realisation within the UK Labour Party that its traditional limited social democratic approach was unlikely to secure electoral victory against the more market-oriented approach associated with Mrs Thatcher (Commission on Social Justice, 1994). 

The core argument is that in a globalised and post-industrial economy, policies must be oriented to ensure a high level of international competitiveness.  Welfare spending (and the associated taxes and labour-costs) must be constrained and services oriented to improving the quality and attractiveness of the work force.   The range of welfare state services must be managed to ensure greater cost-efficiency and at the same time responsiveness to users, to ensure that the mass of the citizenry continued to support them in an increasingly unequal society.  People must be encouraged and empowered to take more responsibility for outcomes and given opportunities to do so.

The goals of meeting need, legitimacy, competitiveness and responsibility are thus met within a lower spending more liberal framework.  In practice this leads to an emphasis on the activation of the labour force, on spending constraint and greater use of the private sector and on the use of new systems of management within the public sector to achieve these ends.  An ideology of equality of opportunity within a more successful economy where services are tailored more to demand rather than the interests of providers replaced that of equality of output and strong support for professionals within a large state welfare sector.

In addition to the linkage with the Neue Mitte, related ideas influence EU policy in the guidelines of the European Employment Strategy with its stress on measures to increase the proportion of the population in paid work, improve the flexibility of the workforce and expand training and education, and to focus such policies more accurately and cost-efficiently (EU, 2006, 2).  They also appear in the stress on both ‘economic dynamism’ and ‘more and better jobs’ in the statement of the 2000 Lisbon European Council, and share important aspects with OECD approaches (Casey 2004).

These changes can be understood in a number of ways.  One important approach emphasizes the assumptions that underlie them about how people act in society.   Third Way approaches see people as essentially proactive and competitive individuals, making rational and deliberative choices to achieve the goals they value and responsive to incentives.  This may be opposed to a more social perspective, which sees them primarily as social animals, influenced in their behaviour by culturally established norms and values and seeking to express their social identities within a particular value-system (a clear summary is provided in Hargreaves-Heap et al., 1992).  While it is a matter of common experience that we are both capable of rational choice and responsive to social influences, particular policy orientations lay the stress on one rather than the other.

One response is to suggest that an emphasis on individual agency runs counter to the theme of collective provision embodied in welfare state services and also to the social democratic politics important in the development of welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2001; Titmuss, 1971).  However people appear capable of pursuing mutual goals at the same time as they advance individual ends.  An individual rational action welfare state is not necessarily a contradiction in terms.

Welfare states redistribute command over resources.  The pattern of redistribution that characterises existing welfare states is sometimes analysed along two dimensions: horizontal transfers over the life-time of individuals, often through social insurance schemes; and vertical transfers between richer and poorer groups, often through means-testing and other forms of targeting.  For welfare states to be successful, citizens must accept the legitimacy of both aspects of redistribution.  They must also have a high degree of confidence in the capacity of government to achieve redistribution along the lines they endorse, and crucially that it will deliver the goods to them when they are vulnerable.  Acceptance of horizontal and vertical redistribution and endorsement of the welfare system as a whole are vital to the success of any welfare state.  One concern is with the impact of the new approach with its rational actor logic on these presumptions.

II.  Rational Choice, Redistribution and Trust

A substantial literature surrounds the relationship between individual rational choice and the capacity to pursue the reciprocity and vertical redistribution implicit in welfare systems.  Much of the work is based on the study of games, with contributions from evolutionary psychology, the analysis of behaviour in situations where people must make choices that affect a group such as the sharing out of common resources like water or fish stocks and work on behaviour in other contexts.

Work on games from Axelrod’s initial analyses of prisoner’s dilemma games (1981) to more recent work on ultimatum, and investment games (for example, Gintis et al 2005; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Rothstein, 2005; Sally, 1995) indicates that self-regarding individuals are nonetheless capable of developing mutual and reciprocal interactions when it is their common interest to do so.  Individuals do not always choose immediate short term advantage when it conflicts with co-operation to achieve longer-term mutual goals.  Contact or communication between those involved and repeated interactions are helpful in sustaining this.  As Ostrom and Walker conclude from their review: ‘in addition to the normative foundations of trustworthy behaviour, knowledge of the “other,” repeated interactions, and the strong possibility of future interactions are strong predictors of both trustworthy and trusting relationships’ (2003, 18.)  

Further work by Henrich et al on ultimatum games played in played for real rewards in 15 small scale societies in 12 countries confirms this view: ‘The selfishness axiom [defecting from a bargain to advance immediate self-interest] is not supported in any society studied..’(Henrich et al, 2004, 49).  Fehr and Gächter build on this to argue ‘there is now little disagreement among experimental researcher about the facts regarding reciprocal behaviour.  There also seems to be an emerging consensus that the propensity to punish harmful behaviour is stronger than the propensity to reward friendly behaviour’ (2000, 162).  The possibility that ‘strong altruism’ is an important factor in the way self-regarding individuals establish norms to govern their interactions so that actions which damage the pursuit of mutual advantage are punished is also emphasized by Gintis et al 2005.  These arguments are reinforced by findings from evolutionary psychology which shows that animal communities ranging from vampire bats to primates exhibit reciprocal redistribution of resources in the interests of the group as a whole and take steps to enforce that norm on immediately selfish members (Boyd and Richerson, 2002, 287; Trivers, 1971; Sober and Wilson, 1998).

These points fit with explanations of social behaviour in areas that include the allocation of common goods (Ostrom, 2002), wage bargaining and the rewarding of soft interpersonal and social skills (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, p.177) and analysis of when people prefer negotiating through incomplete as opposed to rigorous contracts (Molm et al., 2003).  All these arguments support the view that an individual rational approach to one’s interests is compatible with reciprocity within a social group and thus with the horizontal redistribution which has always been the backbone of social welfare systems.  Stress on the individual does not immediately condemn us to the Hobbesian extreme of a ‘war of all against all’.  However, the approach offers much weaker support for vertical redistribution directed at the social inclusion of out-groups who do not obviously have anything to contribute.  As the argument moves nearer home to the welfare state, commentators tend to stress the importance of individual altruism as the prime motive for the advantaged to support vertical redistribution (Goodin and Ware, 1980).  The view that individual rational actor systems and particularly markets will damage altruism was strongly expressed by Titmuss, particularly in his work on blood donorship.   

An important response to this is contained in the work of Le Grand (2003, 2007) who argues that it is possible to designed institutions so that they are robust and accommodate both self-regarding individualist and altruistic motivations.  An example is the grant to support family doctors in refurbishing their premises, taken up by altruists to improve the service and by the selfish to invest in an asset.  Similarly. subsidises that part pay university fees will simply increase the opportunities for other-regarding people to pursue higher education but provide a real incentive for the self-centred.   The core argument is that a welfare state can accommodate both individual rational mutualists, who will endorse redistribution between those who contribute to common services, and individual altruists, who wish to include others on the grounds of simple need, but requires a careful crafting of institutions.

Social trust has also been analysed from a number of viewpoints.  Individualist approaches typically understand trust in terms of the prediction of the behaviour of another in a situation where one cannot control that behaviour (for example, Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988).  Engendering trust is a matter of aligning the incentives that guide the actions of trustor and trustee.  Hardin’s influential work takes this further by stressing the idea of trustworthiness.  Trust is to do with ‘encapsulated interest’ where the trustee has an interest in taking into account the interests of the trustor, her interests are encapsulated in those of the person trusted (2006, 6).  This implies that trust continues over time: the trustee values the continuation of the relationship and has an incentive not to defect for immediate advantage.

More social approaches typically stress shared values which enable the trustee to engage in expressive actions and which include the idea of valuing commitment to the interests of the trustor (Calnan and Rowe 2005; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003; Hoggett et al 2006).  This interpretation is supported in sociological work which analyses trust relationships (Calnan and Sandford 2004; Moellering 2006), political science analysis (Rothstein 2005) and social psychology (Eiser et al 2002; Metlay 1999).

The rational actor logic relies on the alignment of interests by ensuring that an appropriate structure of incentives is in place for providers.  Citizens can have trust in the service because they know that the providers and their managers are responding to the targets set or the signals given by demand in a quasi-market.  However this approach ignores the value aspects of trust, the extent to which trust also involves the belief that the person you trust shares values with you and is actively committed to your interests.  A system of incentives presumes that behaviour does not rely on individual commitments or shared values but on self-regarding responses to rewards or penalties, and thus rests on an individual rational rather than a social interpretation of the concept of trustworthiness.

Different approaches to understanding how people behave in society lie behind the different models of reciprocity, inclusion and trust.  For those coming from an individual rational actor perspective, reciprocity is based on mutual self-interest, and this is a basis for norms of behaviour which establish a framework for redistribution within the group and for punishing those who seek to gain access without being in a position to contribute when appropriate.  Inclusion of the latter group must rest on values of altruism which some individual may happen to hold.  For those adopting a more social approach, the role of institutions in sustaining, reinforcing and transmitting values is crucial.  People’s behaviour is seen as influenced by the values endorsed and communicated through social institutions by processed of acculturation and socialisation.  The institutional structure also allows opportunities to express a particularly identity and negotiate values with others.

The question that preoccupied Titmuss is to do with the way in which social institutions shape values.  He values voluntary blood donorship precisely because it ‘provides and extends opportunities for altruism in opposition to the possessive egoism of the market’ (1970, p.17).  If values are purely individualistic, all we have to do to sustain inclusion is to ensure that the actions required by the inclusive values that some may happen to hold do not conflict directly with those stemming from individual self-interest.  If values are generated and sustained in collective institutions, we also require a framework in which people can express and pursue support for others.  Titmuss’ concern was that the commercialisation of blood donorship would make it much more difficult to express and reinforce a norm of social inclusion through the giving of blood, since it is much more difficult to show that one is endorsing a particular value in doing so.  There is no reason why an altruist can’t continue to give blood.  It is more difficult to show in giving blood that one is behaving altruistically.

Similarly, from the perspective of a rational individualist, trust in the institutions of the welfare state can be secured through aligned incentives between the managers and professionals providing the services and citizens and users.  From a more normative perspective, social provision may offer opportunities to communicate and enact values of commitment and care.  It may also reinforce such values to the extent that service providers are in a position to express them in the way they relate to users both as individuals and in ensuring that more vulnerable groups are included.  To the extent that the service is understood to be provided through an instrumental logic of response to market incentives and central targets (within a framework of sanctions), these opportunities are undermined.  Providers are seen to look upward to policy-makers rather than outward to service-users.  Rational trust  based on assessment of how the service will perform in response to the structure of incentives is increasingly substituted for confidence in the values and commitment of providers.

Blood, which is reproduced through natural processes, is a poor example.  We move on to consider cash benefits which demand taxation and social relations in expensive an highly valued state services, to explore the impact of more individualist ideas on the values of social citizenship. 

III.  The Individual Rational Action Approach in European Welfare State Reform

The main relevant themes in European welfare states are: activation, cost-constraint and privatisation and the introduction of new public management systems.  These reforms have in common an emphasis on greater engagement of the individual service provider, manager or user as a rational actor making individual deliberative choices in securing outcomes.  This leads to greater responsibility but also enhanced opportunities through education and training  and also more use of market competition and incentives.

Activation has been a key theme in labour market policies across Europe, but has moved at a different pace in different countries.  It has been pursued more rapidly in the liberal and majoritarian UK, through the abolition of insurance benefits for unemployment, the move towards a single gateway system which provides individual case-management for all able-bodies benefit applicants, extends work requirements for more categories of claimants, such as lone parents whose children attain a certain age, and disabled people, and develops a structure of benefits to support lower-paid people in work (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004).  Labour market regulation has always been limited and has in fact slightly increased in response to EU directives (Table 1).  In more corporatist and consensus oriented Germany, movement has been slower.  Provision for early retirement have been cut back and benefits for some groups especially younger people reduced, and targeted schemes established.  Case management is being introduced and insurance and assistance benefits amalgamated despite considerable resistance by unions.  The provision of work support benefit has not however been pursued in the context of a more co-ordinated economy where pay social partners retain power over pay negotiation.  Regulation has been to some extent reduced and new categories of part-time work developed (Hudson et al, 2008)..

In France, corporatist but with majoritarian and consensus elements in a presidential, centralised but typically coalition polity, early retirement has been cut back, benefit systems merged and rates cut back and rigorous case management introduced.  The length of entitlement to out of work benefit has been cut.  New benefits to support the lower paid through negative income tax have been introduced (Taylor-Gooby 2005, ch 2).  There have been cut-backs in regulation to facilitate redundancy, and the bipartite local negotiations on the introduction of the 35 hour week promoted flexibility (Pochet 2001)

In the Nordic countries, with corporatist and substantially co-ordinated economies but traditions of left government that ensure that a wide range of interests is included in political negotiation, activation through case-management and support into work has been a central feature of labour market management for a considerable period.  However benefit increases have been constrained, and new lower benefits with work requirements for  groups such as young people introduced.  The OECD index shows a reduction in labour market regulation.  Denmark and the Netherlands in particular have been identified in OECD and EU reports as leading in ‘flexi-curity’ – systems which enhance labour market mobility by reducing regulation which makes it more difficult to move between jobs while providing support through accessible benefits and other services to facilitate people in doing so (EU 2005; Schmid 2005).

Spending constraint and privatisation are evident in reform of pensions, the largest single area of state expenditure.  All European countries have introduced substantial reforms in the face of demographic shifts that presaged rapid increases in spending.  Most of those in which social insurance schemes play the main role have introduced mechanisms to  counter the demographic pressures, typically by adjusting the pension formula to take account of the demographic balance between workers and pensioners. (Hinrichs, 2001).  In the UK reforms in the 1990s cut back and restructured state pensions and sought to expand the already substantial private sector.  These reforms have faced difficulties as the state reduced subsidies to the private sector and pursued ill-judged deregulation measures which severely damaged the reputation of the industry (Taylor-Gooby and Mitton, 2008).  Current policies seek to reinstate the reforms and continue to expand private provision (Hills, 2004).  Projections indicate that some three-quarters of pensioners will be reliant on the means-tested state pension benefit by 2025, so that the net impact of change is to reduce state spending commitments and possibly expand the private sector (Clark and Emmerson, 2003).

In Sweden a series of reforms in the early 1990s cut back state pensions and developed a system where individuals will rely on combined state and private funded pensions.   In Germany, state pensions have also been cut back, differences between different social insurance schemes reduced, and attempts to introduce a new private funded schemes met with a lukewarm response.  The pattern is similar in France where reforms are broadly comparable, although pensions remain at a higher level (Palier, 2004).

The theme of New Public Management has been influential in attempts to introduce greater cost-efficiency and responsiveness in the public sector.  The key themes of this approach are:

-	Separate purchaser and provider of services and introduce quasi-markets and sometimes non-state providers.
-	Break-up of large bureaucracies into separate and typically competing units where the incentives are to balance cost-efficiency and responsiveness and valued by the purchaser rather than to maximise the budget (Niskanen 1971) or to achieve professional goals (Klein 2005).
-	Emphasize choice to ensure the views of end-users are valued (PMSU 2006).
-	Introduce systems of management to ensure that budgets are constrained, quality maintained at the standard desired and services directed as appropriate.

A substantial cross-national literature charts the development of New Public Management (Kettl 2000; Pollit and Bouckaert 2004; Hudson and Lowe 2004; Flynn, 2007).  There are substantial differences in the extent and nature of reform.  In general the most rapid reformers have been the more liberal and social democratic welfare states with more majoritarian systems of government (the UK, New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark) although some federal nations (the US, Canada, Australia) have also made substantial changes.  The corporatist countries have tended to display more inertia and path-dependency as in their economic reforms (see Kettl, Table 4.1; Peters, 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, ch 8).  These are the countries which also move slowly in relation to labour market reform.    The liberal and to some extent social democratic welfare states have also been most prone to developing internal markets and to permitting the entry of private providers in competition with state agencies (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, 179-80)

In the area of health care for example, the UK has split up the NHS (once the largest single employer in western Europe) into more than 400 Trusts operating in a competitive internal market with some private sector entry, new systems for informing citizens of steps they can take to improve their health and of the quality of different trusts, strong central target-setting and regulation of quality, the introduction of private providers in specific areas and is now rolling out a system of patient choice between hospitals and clinics.  In Sweden management is decentralised, greater patient choice introduced and state clinics compete with private providers in some areas (Timonen 2003 ch 6). In consensus-corporatist Germany by contrast the 2000 reform imposes stricter regulation of treatment and the imposition of a national system of payment by diagnosis-related groups, intended to contain costs, but the institutional structure remains intact (Hudson et al, 2008).

The Impact of the Reforms: the UK as a Case-Study

The pace and character of the reforms varies between different welfare states.  The overall themes of constraint in state spending, greater individual responsibility through privatisation the activation of labour markets through incentives and opportunities, and the introduction of more decentralised, entrepreneurial, responsive and cost-efficient management are reflected in most European countries. These approaches are intended to enable governments to contain labour costs and present a more attractive and flexible labour force in international competition, to constrain the costs of meeting expanding social risks and demands, to provide services which are more responsive to the demands of more challenging citizens, and to stress the provision of opportunities as part of a legitimation strategy to gain citizen support.

The UK provides an excellent context to examine the shifts in welfare provision and their impact on welfare state citizenship.  It is a relatively low welfare spender (Chart 1), has less generous systems of pensions and other social benefits and a relatively cheap health care system compared with other large European countries.  One might expect the pressures for cost-efficiency and spending constraint to bite less insistently and the demand for the reframing of social citizenship to be less urgent.  However the changes have been particularly rapid, for reasons to do with the political economy of the country and with its constitutional arrangements.  Governments in the UK are able to pursue reform more rapidly than in most other European countries. 

The background factors that provide the impetus for reform are important in almost all welfare states.  The peculiarities of the UK incline it to develop a rational actor solution with a distinctive enthusiasm even though, in an objective sense, the immediate pressures for change are more limited.  This approach, which is influential in reforms across Europe, is worked through with peculiar clarity in the UK context.

The settlement between public policy and the capitalist market is widely regarded as more liberal in the UK than in the other main European economies.  It is a ‘liberal’ rather than a ‘co-ordinated’ market economy, in Soskice’s analysis (1999).  Its industrial relation are based on ‘competitive’ rather than ‘constructive’ flexibility (Teague and Grahl, 1992).  Its welfare state is liberal, rather than corporatist or social democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  The liberal bias has been strengthened in recent years by political developments but also by the underlying processes of transition to a post-industrial society.  These are relatively advanced in the UK, so that, although the costs of maintaining the traditional welfare settlement are moderate, the political forces that might defend it have grown weaker.  Consequently, the economy of the UK is more open to international competition than that of other large European countries, and this position is highly valued by politicians and policy-makers.  

The UK (which once proclaimed itself the ‘workshop of the world’) is no longer a substantial manufacturing economy (Table 1).  There has been a rapid decline in the sectoral contribution of manufacturing to the GDP, and a shift of the workforce towards service sector employment.  The UK is increasingly a post-industrial work-centred society with a high proportion of the population in paid employment.  The substantial proportion of women participating in the labour market gives an indication of the social shifts that go hand in hand with the policies described earlier. 

Other countries among the major European economies have experienced similar shifts - France in the reduction of significance in manufacturing, Sweden in service sector employment, Sweden and Germany in the proportion of the population in employment and Sweden in women working.  However, none of them parallels the UK  in the pace of change across all the areas.  The economic, political and social shifts which are the driving forces of the reframing of social citizenship are particularly forceful in this country.

The response here, as elsewhere, has been to prioritise flexibility and competitiveness.  For example the Treasury’s recent analysis of long-term economic performance claimed ‘over the past decade this shift [the expansion of the service sector] has been larger in the UK than in any other G7 country. The UK economy’s flexibility means that while its share of world goods trade has fallen in the context of the growth of the emerging economies, it is the only G7 country that has achieved a rising share of global trade in services…Product market flexibility is enhanced by competitive markets with appropriate regulation. The UK’s competition regime generally scores highly in international comparisons’ (HM Treasury, 2008c, p.5).  Similarly the International Monetary Fund argues ‘the United Kingdom has absorbed domestic and global shocks well, thanks to the economy’s flexibility and the strong positioning of macroeconomic and financial policies’ (IMF, 2007).

The high value placed on flexibility and competitiveness and the relative weakness of other centres of power such as trade unions and regional interests render policy-making peculiarly exposed to the imperatives of globalisation.  The importance of global openness and the success of the policies in making the UK attractive to overseas investors are indicated by the evidence on the inflow of foreign investment, higher than any other OECD country apart from Belgium and the US, and just over a fifth of the total for the entire OECD (OECD, 2007f, p.62).  The view that societal changes in the context of globalisation diminish the capacity of government to intervene successfully and create a context in which labour market flexibility and cost-efficiency (the key strengths claimed for the new approaches) are particularly rewarded becomes compelling.    The outcome is that social policy-making is strongly influenced by the individual rational theory of agency.

The UK is peculiarly fitted by its constitutional framework to carry our reforms precipitately.  As Lijphart and others have pointed out, the Westminster first-past-the-post system allows the government, once elected, to pursue its programme with relatively little interference from social partners, courts, regional authorities or other powers (Lijphart, 1999).   Various recent developments, including the success of the Conservative government in the 1980s in reducing the influence of trade unions, and of New Labour in the 1990s in continuing this process and in curtailing its own left wing, have strengthened central authority.  Recent Prime Ministers have taken the centralisation of power further, by weakening the limited authority of the second chamber and of local government and establishing bodies such as the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (from 2002) under their direct control (Baldock, Gray and Jenkins, 2003).  These programmes have been understood and presented by policy-makers and politicians across the political spectrum as the modernisation and restructuring of provision to meet economic and social challenges, rather than as a piecemeal response to circumstances. 

The centralisation of power in the Westminster model tends to influence the democratic process in a particular direction.  Schmidt points out that in more consensual systems, political dialogue is in large part concerned with negotiation and reassurance for the various actors whose views need to be discussed and aligned to make progress possible (2002, ch.1).  These actors will in part take on the role of communicating agreed policy directions to their various constituencies and engaging their support.  In the more directive majoritarian system, government is freer to pursue its programme without marshalling a consensus between stake-holders, but must justify its policies to the electorate.  Political dialogue is more a process of top-down communication.  In the UK, the most centralised of European democracies, political discourse is concerned with the critique and justification of a relatively coherent set of policies, so that clues as to the logic of reform can be gathered from that dialogue.  Discussion of the rationale for change is widely available from various political standpoints (for example Castles, 2004, Pierson, 2006, Swank, 2003, Snower, 1993,  Willetts, 19980.  The pronouncements of policy-makers and the analyses of academics both indicate that it is the individual rational actor logic that has predominated in the UK.  

Welfare state reforms in the UK have been precipitate.  Since 1990, governments in the UK have:

	Radically reformed the benefit systems, abolishing insurance provision for unemployed people and reorganising assistance to create an entirely new systems of benefits, with extensive case-management.

	Completely restructured state involvement in the labour market to promote incentives for low-waged workers, including the introduction of a statutory minimum wage (1999), a substantial tax credit system (from 1998), and the New Deal  from 1998 as the centrepiece of New Labour policies.

	Restructured child care support and also elder care provision and radically expanded employment rights for parents and others.

	Reformed pensions with an expanded role for the private sector and cut-backs in commitment from the state system.

	Undertaken the most substantial restructuring of the national health care system since its inception in 1945, explicitly in order to promote responsiveness and cost-efficiency.

We move on to consider the public response to welfare state reform in the UK

IV.  Attitudes to State Welfare in the UK: Redistribution, Inclusion and Trust

The implication that changes in welfare states have gone hand in hand with shifts in attitudes that bear heavily on the social inclusion aspects of welfare is strengthened by evidence from attitude surveys.
 
Reciprocity, tax and spending

Recent quantitative and qualitative studies demonstrate the significance of reciprocity in attitudes to social welfare.  Sefton reanalyses the 2004 British Social Attitudes data set to show that is endorsed by just over half the population: ‘there is general support for the principle of the welfare state as a system that supports people when they need help – whether or not they have enough money to pay – and that spreads the cost of doing so according to people’s ability to pay’.  This is coupled with ‘resentment of those seen as abusing the system by not contributing what they reasonably can and drawing out more than they reasonably need’ (Sefton, 2005, p.27).

Similar themes emerge from cluster analysis of a range of questions on attitudes to tax and benefits which take into account moral principles of desert and entitlement.  In addition to majority support for reciprocity, the study identifies two other groups, each accounting for about a quarter of the sample.  These are the ‘rugged individualists’ who believe people should be self-reliant, responsible for meeting their own needs, and that the state should have a minimal role, and the ‘Samaritans’ who endorse redistributive welfare on the basis of need (Sefton 2005, p.23).

Qualitative researchers add a further insight into how the framing of social interests from an individualist perspective constrains reciprocity.  Hedges used focus groups and discursive interviews to examine understanding of fairness and welfare.  The model that emerges combines combining exclusion and reciprocity.  People should get help when they need it, provided they make every effort to help themselves, but the cost of the services should be spread approximately according to the ability to pay.  There are many criticisms of service provision.  Some individuals unfairly claim benefits to which they are or should not be entitled, and should be punished.  The most common account of why someone did not deserve support referred to a failure to contribute to the common ‘pot’ when one could (Hedges, 2005, p.5).  However the scope and inclusiveness of such reciprocity is heavily constrained.

When they think about taxation and social spending, most people treated them as independent areas and failed to connect the two. Tax is an unpleasant topic and taxes are generally resented.  Welfare spending, on the other hand, provides services that are valued.  The conceptual disconnection is confirmed in other work.  A Fabian Society study based on  a national survey and qualitative interviews concluded: ‘the link has collapsed in people’s minds both between themselves and the taxes they pay, and between those taxes and the public services they are being spent on’ (Commission on Taxation and Citizenship, 2000, p.55).  The British Social Attitudes survey asks separate questions about tax and spending.  The proportion of those interviewed who want spending on health and welfare to be increased rather than cut or kept constant has fluctuated around half since the survey started in the early 1980s.  It rose somewhat between 1987 and 1996 and thereafter fell back (Chart 2).  Conversely, the largest group in the electorate think tax is too high, especially for low and middle earners.  This applies even among those who endorse more welfare spending.  The point is most striking when we focus on views on tax on high earners.  The percentage of those who favour higher spending, who nevertheless think tax is too high or about right even for high earners, fell slightly during the late 1980s from 45 per cent in 1987 but then rose to 56 per cent in 2006.  Most people, not irrationally, want lower taxes and more spending at the same time.  They are steadily abandoning any support for redistributive tax and spend from higher to other income groups.  The sphere in which reciprocity between those who contribute at times and receive benefits and services at others appears if anything to be shrinking.  

Perceptions of poverty and inequality have shifted markedly since the 1980s in the UK.  Much of the change has taken place in the last decade.  Rising average incomes are certainly reflected in the fact that people feel better off​[1]​.  In 1986, 24 per cent of those interviewed in the British Social Attitudes survey said they felt they were ‘living comfortably’ while 26 per cent were finding it ‘difficult or very difficult’. By 1994, corresponding statistics were 29 and 21 per cent, while by 2006 the ‘comfortable’ group had expanded sharply to 41 per cent, and those finding things difficult had fallen to 14 per cent (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008, p.239).  The proportion thinking of an unemployed couple as ‘really poor’ fell from 12 to four per cent and for a pensioner couple from 19 to nine per cent.

These shifts may well reflect an experience of growing affluence among the majority. They do not imply that people no longer recognise poverty and inequality as issues of social justice.  For example, 79 per cent state in 1987 that the gap between high and low income was ‘too large’.  This had risen to 87 per cent by 1995 but fell back to 76 per cent by 2006.  Correspondingly the proportion sharing the view that ‘ordinary people don’t get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’ rose slightly from 64 to 66 and then fell somewhat to 55 per cent during the same period.

The role of government

Analysis of the British Social Attitudes Survey data from the mid 1980s onwards shows that more than three-quarters (between 73 and 85 per cent) of the population think inequality is a problem and over half (between 64 an 55 per cent) think it is an issue of social justice.  Perceptions of inequality rose during early 1990s and have since fallen slightly (Chart 3).   What appears to have changed is how people think the issue should be tackled.  Support for state intervention to address inequality is more limited throughout the period and appears to be in decline.  In the UK, the proportion stating that ‘government is responsible for reducing differences in income’ fell from 62 per cent in 1987 to 43 per cent in 2004, while support for the view that ‘government should spend more on welfare benefits for the poor’ fell from 55 to 35 per cent between 1987 and 2006, and that it ‘should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off’ fell from 45 to 34 per cent over the same period (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008, Table 11.1, see also Johns and Padgett, 2008, p.208).   When the question is phrased to cover stronger interventions general support for the policy declines.

Chart 3 shows how the gap between perceptions of inequality and endorsement of government action to remedy the problem has changed.  Despite fluctuations, the overall trend is to an increase from 33 to 42 per cent.  Similarly, qualitative interviews and focus groups conducted by Pahl, Rose and Spencer (2007) show that most people are well aware of the growth and scale of inequality.  However they are now more likely to think in terms of differences in life-style rather than income and to understand social change in terms of individualism and choice rather than class inequality.  Government becomes almost irrelevant to inequality since it is viewed as a matter of consumption pattern, personal choice and aspiration.

The International Social Survey project includes questions on both perceptions of inequality and beliefs about whether it is the role of government to address the issue, but unfortunately includes few European countries during the period.  In West Germany concern about inequality fluctuated between 76 and 72 per cent, while support for interventions fell from 61 to 47 per cent.  In Austria corresponding figures are 81 to 84 per cent against 80 to 69 per cent (ISSP, 2008).    Responses to a question in the European Social Survey about whether ‘government should reduce differences in income levels’ show a gradual decline in support between 2002 and 2006, from 62 to 57 per cent of those interviewed in the UK.  Support for the idea that the issue is really one of individual effort, and that the role of government should be confined to ensuring that the playing field is level (‘it is important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities’) has strengthened, from 66 to 73 per cent (ESS, 2008).  

As support for intervention declines, poverty is increasingly located within the individual.  A series of questions which are very widely used in international surveys investigates popular explanations for poverty (see Economic and Social Data Service, 2008, for questionnaires and further details).  In 1994, 29 per cent of those interviewed in the British Social Attitudes survey attributed poverty to ‘injustice in society’, 48 per cent put it down to such factors as ‘bad luck’ or ‘inevitability in modern society’ and only 15 per cent to individual characteristics like ‘laziness or lack of willpower’.  By 2006 laziness was seen as the prime factor by 27 per cent, while injustice had fallen to 21 per cent and bad luck was roughly the same at 44 per cent.  If poverty is a matter of personal failings rather than injustice or the operation of modern capitalism, state intervention may seem inappropriate.

Our focus group work​[2]​ on perceptions of fairness in society showed an emphasis on equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome as often the first component mentioned when the participants were asked an introductory question about their conception of a ‘fair society’.  Typical responses were phrased in terms of ‘opportunity for all’; ‘every single person has access to every part of society if they want or need it.’; ‘you have got to earn your standard of living don’t you?... [but]…with an equal society you have to have been given the opportunity’ (Martin, 2007, p.1).  However, while equality of opportunity finds some support among almost everyone interviewed, there are differences of emphasis.  This interpretation of fairness is advanced much more strongly by the middle class respondents: ‘equality of outcome is more extensively and sympathetically discussed among the working class groups, with far more consensus on the merits of equal outcomes than in the case of the middle class’ (Martin, 2007).  Once again, the task of government is to enhance opportunities rather than redistribute income and guarantee equal outcomes.

The pattern of attitudes to reciprocity and social inclusion is complex.  The view that the welfare state is mainly about reciprocity among those able to contribute is well-entrenched, although there is some indication that the limits of reciprocity are being drawn more strictly.  Most people in the UK do not make a strong link between their ideas on spending and on tax.  Support for government intervention to redistribute and for the taxes to support is growing weaker.  It is not possible to demonstrate any causal link between the policy environment and public attitudes.  However there are indications that endorsement for the inclusion component of social citizenship is growing weaker at a time when the idea of individual proactivity, responsibility and opportunity predominates in policy-making.





It is difficult to find evidence on the extent of trust in social welfare services.  Cross-national surveys do not appear to cover the area of trust in services as opposed to trust in government in general or in other citizens (see for example Delhey and Newton 2003).  One way forward is to take the experience of the UK NHS.  This is of particular interest because it is a major and highly-valued social service undergoing extensive new managerial reforms, indeed the most far-reaching such reforms of any sector in the UK.  It has also received large increases in resources so that the reforms have taken place in a relatively benign climate.  There is a striking contrast between achievement and popular responses.

The outcomes appear at first sight positive.  Government set a number of targets for the service the most important of which concerned waiting times for treatment and death rates from heart disease and cancer.  There has been substantial improvement.  The objective of ending waiting times longer than three months for outpatients was effectively achieved by the end of 2005.  For inpatients, waiting times for almost all cases fell below six months by early 2006.  This is an unprecedented achievement for a service that provides medical care in effect free at the point of demand and traditionally rationed by delay.   Overall mortality from heart disease, stroke and related illness had fallen from 141 per 100,000 (under 75) in 1995-7 to 97 by 2002-4 and from cancers from 141 to 122 deaths per 100,000.   The inequality gap between the bottom fifth of areas by health and deprivation indices and the population as a whole had fallen from 37 to 28 per cent for the first cause of death and 21 to 19 per cent for the second (actually achieving the 2010 target (HM Treasury 2007).  It can plausibly be argue that much for the decline in cardiac and cancer mortality is a long-term trend related to exercise, nutrition and pharmacology.  However this argument is less convincing for inequalities in health, where the trend is not so well-established (Charts 5 and 6)  These achievements are considerable and perhaps merit more attention than they receive in public debate.

The success of new managerialism in the NHS can be further demonstrated through regional comparisons.  The reforms were most vigorously pursued in the UK, both Wales and Scotland receiving the extra funding but deciding not to implement the targets and the internal market.  Most studies agree that England has performed better, in fact waiting lists actually rose in Wales ( Bevan and Hood, 2006; Auditor-General for Wales, 2006).  A study by Alvarez Rosette and others emphasizes the difficulty of establishing satisfactory indicators after devolution, and concludes that Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales do not ‘have more activity, better population health, or higher levels of public satisfaction…The most striking differences between 1996 and 2002 are in the reported reductions in waiting in England’ (2005, 7552, see also Propper et al, 2007 and Le Grand, 2007, 25-6 for similar findings).  New managerialism resting on strong incentives changes the behaviour of those providing the service in the short term.

In this context, public opinion evidence is striking.  Chart 7 shows IPSOS-MORI’s long-running public delivery index.  Over time those believing that public services as a whole will get better are outnumbered by those believing that they will get worse fluctuates around a stable average.  However, popular support for the view that the NHS will improve has deteriorated over time, with rallies at about the time of much-publicised spending increases in 2002 and an election in 2005.  This runs against the evidence of improved provision.  The implication is that popular perceptions are not driven simply by trends in the quality of the service, despite the fact that a large proportion of the population come into contact with health care services.

One clue is provided by attitude survey evidence.  Trust in the service managers at the centre of the reforms is lower than in the professional staff whose control over provision has been eroded.  A question about trust asked in the 2002 survey found 77 per cent of nurses and 66 per cent of hospital doctors were trusted to put the interests of patients above the convenience of the hospital at least most of the time, while only 21 per cent of hospital managers were (Britsocat, 2007, see also Page 2004; Calnan and Sandford 2004).   Similarly qualitative work points to concerns that the newly developed service does not put the patient first.   Quotations from a large qualitative survey carried out in southern England in 2007 (Wallace and Taylor-Gooby 2008) illustrate the point:

And all the problems with management and the sort of structure of it and I think it is not about health anymore, it is about numbers. It is not about caring, it is not about health (Susanne, middle class, children).

These hospitals are being run by managing directors and the thing is it hasn’t made people feel any better or feel any more comfortable. All they want to do is get seen to and a bit of respect, a bit of dignity, a clean hospital and seen quick and…they put targets out and I haven’t noticed I feel happier when I use the hospitals and stuff (Phineas, middle class, no children).

The NHS used to have values - putting the patient first, proper nursing, but now it seems to be paper pushing, reports on reports that kind of thing… No, they have got to think this through. Think about the people and the whole system and what it was set up for. They have completely forgotten the value of the NHS which is for the people (Ronald, working class, children).

Those interviewed do not believe that the interests of those running the restructured health service are successfully aligned with those of users.  The system of incentives and targets designed by policy-makers to achieve this end is seen as failing because it does not follow the values of the traditional service.  These are to do with care and commitment outwards to patients rather than upwards to managerial priorities.  The indication is that trust requires more then the alignment of the incentives of managers with the goals of policy-makers.  The extent to which service-providers are seen as embodying the values of users also appears important.  The new managerial approach fails to provide this.

Conclusion: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater?

The experience of the UK illustrates a more general point.  Welfare state reforms across a large number of countries have been concerned to balance competing economic and social goals.  The tension between meeting an expanding range of needs and ensuring that the welfare system contributes to a competitive and successful national economy has become increasingly severe as a result of economic, political and social changes associated with post-industrialism and globalisation.  One solution, increasingly popular across a range of European countries, is the combination of labour market activation, cost-constraint, expansion of private provision and new managerialism, resting ultimately on a rational actor logic.

These policies have been pursued with more or less enthusiasm in a number of countries and most effectively in the UK.  Rational actor logics are not, as some commentators have implied, automatically inimical to state welfare.  Indeed a range of theoretical and applied work indicates that behaviour that embraces an enlightened self-interest corresponding to the reciprocal aspects of welfare states is likely to be pursued by rational actors.  However the inclusion of those who do not obviously have an equivalent contribution to make is more difficult.  This appears to correspond to the evidence that while people remain concerned about inequality, they are much less likely to believe that government should tackle the issue.  Benefits have tended to become less generous and there has been a policy shift to mobilise those on low incomes into work, with corporatist countries moving at the slowest pace.

The trust in the welfare state that is essential to the political legitimacy of the whole system may also be eroded by reform.  A case-study of the UK NHS indicates that real improvements in performance do not lead to greater public enthusiasm for the service as a simple rational actor model would suggest.  Indeed there is some evidence that the new managerialist system damages trust because it does not provide a role for such public concerns.

A final point concerns the capacity of the new approach to respond to these problems.  Within its own analysis, the new approach is successful.  Those following the individual rational actor logic in the UK Treasury at the heart of policy-making (Deakin and Parry 2000) tend to be convinced by the evidence of improvements according to targets and by the logic of the market.  The broader analysis that sees the social aspects of trust approached through softer attitudinal data as also of importance tends to carry less weight.  The possibility is that the reform programme undertaken for excellent reasons may succeed in the short term in promoting the cost-efficiency of welfare systems, but erode the political legitimacy and thus the electoral support for inclusive and universal welfare state citizenship.

The pressures that lead to the current direction in welfare state reform are unlikely to diminish.  Policy-makers will need to ensure that welfare systems are cost-efficient, to ensure that the increased labour costs resulting from higher social spending are justified in competitive globalised markets, and are responsive to the needs of the electorate to sustain political viability.  We have argued that one approach, the retreat of the state from direct intervention to the shaping of incentives and opportunities implicit in the Third Way, opens the possibility that social citizenship will be increasingly confined to reciprocity between those able to contribute in a low-trust system.  How are governments to maintain extensive and inclusive welfare states?

A number of writers have argued that the individualism, mirroring the dominant stream in neo-classical economics and discussed above, requires balancing by greater  reliance on social communitarianism and on political participation.  One position is that the best foundation for social inclusion and social trust is social capital nurtured by the existence of a web of strong but not exclusive relationships within the community.  Putnam seeks to demonstrate that it is strong social capital that facilitated both growth (through trust that enabled commercial relationships) and social integration (by reconciling different groups) in a number of successful societies (1993, 2000).   The empirical evidence for the importance of social capital is unclear (Tarrow, 1996; Hall, 1999).  Some writers have pointed to the possibility that some forms of social capital are likely to strengthen barriers against the inclusion of out-groups.  Of particular relevance is the argument that social capital in modern societies is rather the outcome than the precursor of inclusive social welfare systems (Rothstein, 2005, 54-6).  In any case, policies designed to foster social capital may be helpful in expanding the scope of reciprocity (Aldridge and Halpern, 2002), it is unclear how social capital beyond the local community level is to be developed in an increasingly market-dominated world.

Participation exercises play a strong role in public policy, from the polling, focus groups, consultation activities, road-shows and media campaigns carried out in relation to any new initiative through the multiplicity of ways in which providers seek to communicate and interact with service users, through web-sites, questionnaires, email and now texting, to the use of citizen’s juries, user groups and other set-piece exercises.  These approaches appear limited in their capacity to engage citizens and particularly members of more vulnerable groups and enable them to present their interests effectively.   Debates about democracy and welfare often share an emphasis on enabling service-users, particularly members of weaker or more vulnerable groups, to press home their interests to providers and, more generally, in a broader social discourse.

Lister argues for the extension of ‘solidarity in difference’ across social groups to enable the development of an effective and inclusive gender politics (2003, p.199).  Beckett follows this approach by stressing the importance of ‘bridging ties’ in enabling different vulnerable groups to develop shared struggle against disempowering procedures (2006, p.198).  Ellison points to the possibilities for ‘defensive engagement’ by service users as their interests are threatened (1997).   Beresford (2003) and Lawson (2007) promote the engagement of the most vulnerable service-users as full stake-holders in provision, with a right to share in management.  Elstub (2008) analyses the processes of deliberative democracy among voluntary sector groups.   Howell and Pearce (2001) argue that liberal individualism weakens the capacity of groups in civil society to organise and develop an oppositional discourse to official practices.

While these approaches may promote greater responsiveness to user sentiment and, when they go well, enhance public trust, it is unclear how they reconcile growth and inclusion.  This leads to the suggestion that it is participation at a more basic level, where the range of priorities and how they are to be reconciled that is the missing component in social citizenship.  A number of writers, most importantly Habermas (1987), have argued that modernisation releases individuals from the bounds of traditional society but at the same time traps them within the conflicting interests of the market roles of employee, consumer, manager, owner and tax-payer, voter, citizen.  The interests associated with each role prevent the bearer from taking an overview and negotiating a common interest.  This leads to demands for citizenship that spans the social and political, for a more dialogic democracy.

Whether the assumptions of Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ are realisable except under exceptional circumstances is debateable.  However, progress could be made by promoting greater political participation in political processes by all stakeholders, including weaker and more vulnerable groups, and in the UK the disenfranchised migrants and non-registered residents.  This would involve such developments as investment in civic education, shifts away from constitutional frameworks that advantage entrenched groups, such as the UK system, mechanisms to erode the interests associated with such divisive institutions as the preservation and transmission of privilege, through taxation of inheritance.  While such changes might not refound the social aspects citizenship, they would enable citizens to feel engaged in making better informed decisions about social priorities and about the appropriate contributions and benefits and incentives and penalties to be available to different groups.  This might expand the boundaries of reciprocity as the capacity of in-groups to enhance advantage diminished, extend social inclusion, by generating greater opportunities for contribution and participation by out-groups and build trust though social engagement.  Market individualism is likely to remain a strong force in any globalised, post-industrial society.  These changes would permit the question of the balance between growth and social integration to enter political debate across society.






Table 1: The UK and Europe

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Sweden	UK
Manufacturing sector, % GDP				
1995	16	23	22	19	22	21
2005	13	23	18	16	20	13
Employment in services, % total employment		
1995	69	61	59	61	71	71
2005	73	68	65	65	76	76
Employment, % pop of working age			
2007	63	73	59	67	76	72
Women’s participation rate, % pop of working age			
1995	60	62	43	46	76	66
2005	65	67	51	58	76	69




Sources:   	Manufacturing Sector and Employment: OECD (2008a)
		Participation Rates: OECD (2007, Table 20)
		Trade and GDP: OECD (2008b)




Table 2: Concerns about Inequality and Enthusiasm for Government Policies, 1987–2006

	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2004	2006
% say gap between high and low incomes is “too large”	79	79	87	81	82	73	76
Base	2847	1445	1234	2091	1148	2146	2170
% agree …							
… ordinary people don’t get their fair share of the nation’s wealth	64	67	66	60	63	53	55
Base	2493	2702	3135	2450	2900	2609	3748
… govt. responsible for reducing differences in income	62	64	n/a	65	n/a	43	n/a
Base	1212	1224	n/a	804	n/a	1737	n/a
… govt. should spend more on welfare benefits for the poor	55	58	49	40	44	36	35
Base	1281	2481	3135	2450	2900	2609	2822
… govt. should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off	45	41	47	36	39	32	34
Base	2493	2702	3135	2450	2900	2609	3748

n/a = not asked





 Chart 1: Total Social Expenditure (% GDP)


Source OECD SocX extracted 8.4.2008







Chart 3: Perceptions of Inequality and Demands for State Intervention (British Social Attitudes %)





Source: ONS data analysed by Cancer Research UK at:  http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/mortality/timetrends/?a=5441 (​http:​/​​/​info.cancerresearchuk.org​/​cancerstats​/​mortality​/​timetrends​/​?a=5441​)


Chart 7:  Expectations that Public Services will improve ‘over the next few years’ (%)

Note: Statistics are net measures: those who think the service will ‘get better’ minus the percentage who think it will ‘get worse’. 
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^1	  The discussion of attitude data draws on work by Peter Taylor-Gooby and Rose Martin financed by the Anglo German Foundation.
^2	  Eight focus groups were carried out in contrasting areas in the Midlands and South-East to examine attitudes to social justice, fairness, equality and social provision in 2007-8.  The groups were balanced to include equal numbers of older and younger middle and working class participants and of women and men.  The work was funded by the Anglo-German Foundation.  Rose Martin made a major contribution to the analysis. 
